So, in roughly a year, the American posture on the diplomatic competition between Taiwan and China had moved from a narrow assessment of its impact on stability in cross-strait relations to a much wider depiction reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine.
In this depiction the United States indicated a willingness to intervene officially in matters beyond the strait area that affected relations between China and Taiwan. One instance does not, necessarily, represent a change in policy. To answer the first question: the reaction described above is consistent with the direction American China policy was taking during the summer of Sino-American relations under President Trump continued on the downward trend that had begun in the last days of the Obama administration.
This direction was aggressively promoted by Secretary of Defense James Mattis who toured the area the summer of warning of Chinese economic and military ambitions and proposing that the United States National Guard link up with South American military. In contrast to this trend, after the December, phone call between Trump and Tsai, the cross-strait issue did not figure prominently in the worsening Sino-American relationship — at least as far as the Executive Branch was concerned. However, the legislation was not a radical departure from past initiatives regarding arms sales, military cooperation and visits.
This was consistent with the growing concern regarding the direction of Chinese foreign policy, in general and toward Latin America, in particular. Indeed, this denial of Taiwan sovereign state status is not only one of the few areas of agreement between the two, it is an important pillar supporting Sino-American relations. Since normalization in , it has allowed the United States to balance the provision of essential support for Taiwan with some acknowledgement of Chinese sensitivities. However, if it is the former, caution is necessary, as the consequences for stability in the area would be significant.
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Article first published online: January 19, ; Issue published: November 1, Tuan Y. Abstract Abstract.
On the other side of the coin, Washington is also concerned not to leave any impression that the referendum is a justification for the use of force against Taiwan. House of Representatives, U. And we have made a good start. The Arts Cultural and creative engagement with Taiwan is an important aspect of our shared people-to-people links. Dispatched from the UK in 3 business days When will my order arrive? Now an alliance is a special form of security partnership, and scholars of international relations tell us that the parties to any alliance will have a couple of fears.
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This CRS Report, updated through the th Congress, provides an overview with analysis of the major issues in U.S. policy on Taiwan. The purpose and scope of this CRS [Congressional Research Service] report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the major issues.
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